The Court rejected a rule of causation that focused "solely on whether protected conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire," on the grounds that such a rule could make the employee better off by exercising his constitutional rights than by doing nothing at all. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), was an important decision by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of employer liability for sex discrimination.The Court held that the employer, the accounting firm Price Waterhouse, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision regarding employment would have been the same if sex discrimination had not occurred. Title VII unambiguously states that an employer who makes decisions "because of" sex has violated the statute. I agree with the plurality that, on the facts presented in this case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins' candidacy absent consideration of her gender. Without explicitly mentioning this portion of § 706(g), we have in the past held that Title VII does not authorize affirmative relief for individuals as to whom, the employer shows, the existence of systemic discrimination had no effect. The verbal formulae we have used in our precedents are synonymous with but-for causation. (b) Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases, and one of these rules is that the parties need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made.'" In deciding as we do today, we do not traverse new ground. [Footnote 3] Yet the statute does not purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers may take into account in making employment decisions. The legislative history of Title VII bears out what its plain language suggests: a substantive violation of the statute only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate criterion is the "but-for" cause of an adverse employment action. Confusion in the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. Pp. Of the 662 partners at the firm at that time, 7 were women. Pp. The Transportation Management decision was based on the deference that the Court traditionally accords NLRB interpretations of the statutes it administers. . Given that both the plaintiff and defendant bear a burden of proof in cases such as this one, it is surprising that the dissent insists that our approach requires the employer to bear "the ultimate burden of proof." The plurality went on to emphasize that in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may not simply point to a statistical disparity in the employer's work force. to repropose her for partnership, she sued Price Waterhouse under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. Regardless of the character of the evidence presented, we have consistently held that the ultimate burden "remains at all times with the plaintiff." Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. Burdine, 450 U.S., at 258, 101 S.Ct., at 1096. (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). In addition to the statistical evidence presented by petitioner in that case, we noted that the State's "selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." with the plaintiff bearing the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue whether the employment action was taken because of discrimination. . The burden shift properly will be found to apply in only a limited number of employment discrimination cases. That phrase, I respectfully submit, embodies a rather simple concept that the plurality labors to ignore. Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment "tort" created by Title VII has two basic purposes. 1478, 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Continued adherence to the evidentiary scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. Instead, the Court outlined the following approach: "Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a 'substantial factor' -- or, to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him. R. N. EVINS. In other cases, Title VII's protections properly extend to plaintiffs who are by no means model employees. This difference is decisive in distinguishing this case from those involving "pretext." See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, this Court considered whether an employment decision is made “because of” sex in a “mixed-motive” case, i.e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision. Addition of a second burden-shifting mechanism, the application of which itself depends on assessment of credibility and a determination whether evidence is sufficiently direct and substantial, is not likely to lend clarity to the process. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 499, 106 S.Ct. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Events that are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have any "cause" at all. . I read the opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show that an adverse employment decision would have been supported by legitimate reasons. "To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor." Healthy does not improperly shift from the plaintiff the ultimate burden of persuasion on whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against him or her. Sometimes this may mean that no finding of discrimination is justified even though a qualified employee is passed over by a less than admirable employer. 601 (1987) (noting high reversal rate caused by use of Title VII burden shifting in a jury setting). That court remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings to determine appropriate relief, and those proceedings have been stayed pending our decision. Id., at 997, 108 S.Ct., at 2790. The employer must rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The District Court also based liability on Price Waterhouse's failure to "make partners sensitive to the dangers [of stereotyping], to discourage comments tainted by sexism, or to investigate comments to determine whether they were influenced by stereotypes." Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664-665 (CA7 1987). T. HE. Title VII expressly provides that an employer need not give preferential treatment to employees or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in order to maintain a workforce in balance with the general population. This evidentiary scheme essentially requires the employer to place the employee in the same position he or she would have occupied absent discrimination. The plurality attempts to reconcile its internal inconsistency on the causation issue by describing the employer's showing as an "affirmative defense." § 2000e-2(e). of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 -- which clearly contemplate that an individual disparate treatment plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation -- that departure is justified in cases, such as the present, where the plaintiff, having presented direct evidence that the employer placed substantial, though unquantifiable, reliance on a forbidden factor in making an employment decision, has taken her proof as far as it could go, such that it is appropriate to require the defendant, which has created the uncertainty as to causation by considering the illegitimate criterion, to show that its decision would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns. 450 U.S., at 253, 101 S.Ct., at 1093. 321, 825 F.2d 458, reversed and remanded. That it is a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for gender stereotyping to play a significant role in evaluating an employee's work performance. As the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals observed, acceptance of such theories would turn Title VII "from a prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist thoughts." Further, the suggestion that the employer should bear the burden of persuasion due to superior access to evidence has little force in the Title VII context, where the liberal discovery rules available to all litigants are supplemented by EEOC investigatory files. No. The employer's proof on the point is to be presented and reviewed just as with any other evidentiary question: the Court does not accept the plurality's suggestion that an employer's evidence need be "objective" or otherwise out of the ordinary. This would even more plainly be the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors motivated the adverse action. Burdine makes clear that the, "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.". Respondent was a senior manager in an office of petitioner professional accounting partnership when she was proposed for partnership in 1982. id. We are told next that but-for cause is not required, since the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of." 7254 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). McDonnell Douglas and Burdine clearly contemplated that a disparate treatment plaintiff could show that the employer's proffered explanation for an event was not "the true reason," either because it never motivated the employer in its employment decisions or because it did not do so in a particular case. Finally, I am convinced that a rule shifting the burden to the defendant where the plaintiff has shown that an illegitimate criterion was a "substantial factor" in the employment decision will not conflict with other congressional policies embodied in Title VII. See also East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-404, n. 9, 97 S.Ct. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 490 U. S. 237-258. Tr. should have shifted to Price Waterhouse to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . Syllabus. However, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that discrimination based on the failure of an IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 4 (26.4.4) | Page 2 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). Finally, some courts have held that, under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it is the employer who has the burden of showing that its limitations on the work that it allows a pregnant woman to perform are necessary in light of her pregnancy. We do not, however, limit their statements to the context of race, but instead we take them as general statements on the meaning of Title VII. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.". To avoid bearing the burden of justifying its decision, the employer need not seek racial or sexual balance in its workforce; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance on forbidden criteria in making its employment decisions. See infra at 490 U. S. 247, n. 12. Plaintiff's Exh. In the BFOQ context this is a sensible, indeed necessary, allocation of the burden, for there by definition sex is the but-for cause of the employment decision and the only question remaining is how the employer can justify it. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 417 U. S. 196 (1974). Ante at 490 U. S. 244-247. cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such comments. A court that finds for a plaintiff under this standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate motive was a "but-for" cause of the employment decision. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. Because we did not wish to, "place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing,", id. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 253. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Price Waterhouse does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the refusal to repropose her for partnership amounted to a constructive discharge. . § 160(c). L. YNN . I thus concur in the judgment of the Court. We use the words this way in everyday speech. 263 U.S.App.D.C. Trial and appellate courts will therefore be saddled with the task of developing standards for determining when to apply the burden shift. 60, 67 (1956). 263 U.S.App.D.C. Ante, at 242. 2399, 2404-2407, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Moreover, placing the burden on the defendant in this case to prove that the same decision would have been justified by legitimate reasons is consistent with our interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Id., at 287, 97 S.Ct., at 576 (footnote omitted). Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 321, 340, 825 F.2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J., dissenting). McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S., at 805, 93 S.Ct., at 1826. The Transpo tation Management decision was based on the deference that the Court traditionally accords NLRB interpretations of the statutes it administers. Thus, I disagree with the plurality's dictum that the words "because of" do not mean "but-for" causation; manifestly they. Moreover, there is mounting evidence in the decisions of the lower courts that respondent here is not alone in her inability to pinpoint discrimination as the precise cause of her injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role in the decisional process. Long before her bid for partnership, partners evaluating her work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff members. One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard once it has placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the employer. Like a disparate treatment plaintiff, one who asserts that governmental action violates the Equal Protection Clause must show that he or she is "the victim of intentional discrimination." Healthy was a First Amendment case involving the firing of a teacher, and Transportation Management involved review of the NLRB's interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join. 100 Cong.Rec. In Arlington Heights, a group of minority plaintiffs claimed that a municipal governing body's refusal to rezone a plot of land to allow for the construction of low-income integrated housing was racially motivated. The prima facie case established there was not difficult to prove, and was based only on the statistical probability that when a number of potential causes for an employment decision are eliminated an inference arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the motivation behind the decision. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Tranportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 427 U. S. 282, n. 10 (1976). Under my approach, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference that the decision was made "because of" the plaintiff's protected status. We made passing reference to a similar question in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 427 U. S. 282, n. 10 (1976), where we stated that, when a Title VII plaintiff seeks to show that an employer's explanation for a challenged employment decision is pretextual, "no more is required to be shown than that race was a but for' cause." The plurality describes this as a case about the standard of causation under Title VII, ante at 490 U. S. 237, but I respectfully suggest that the description is misleading. affirmative defense, that it would have made the same decision even absent the impermissible motive. The present, active tense of the operative verbs of § 703(a)(1) ("to fail or refuse"), in contrast, turns our attention to the actual moment of the. As the opinions make plain, the evidentiary scheme created today is not for every case in which a plaintiff produces evidence of stray remarks in the workplace. Ante, at 241. The presence of an existing burden-shifting mechanism distinguishes the individual disparate treatment case from the tort, classaction discrimination, and equal protection cases on which. This would even more plainly be the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place, but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors motivated the adverse action. Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer's decisions, the burden shifts to the employer "to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for legitimate reasons." of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision, and we refrain from deciding here which specific facts, "standing alone," would or would not establish a plaintiff's case, since such a decision is unnecessary in this case. She had proved discriminatory input into the decisional process, and had proved that participants in the process considered her failure to conform to the stereotypes credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a substantial factor in the decision. . 7213 (1964). In mixed-motives cases, however, there is no one "true" motive behind the decision. 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 250. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's burden in this regard. . Where the plaintiff makes the requisite showing, the burden that shifts to the employer is to show that legitimate employment considerations would have justified the decision without reference to any impermissible motive. Id., at 253, 101 S.Ct., at 1093. This Court's prior decisions demonstrate that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision thereby places the burden on the defendant to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive. ante at 19, and that this "is not an imposition of liability where sex made no difference to the outcome,'" ante at 490 U. S. 246, n. 11. First, the Court makes clear that the Price Waterhouse scheme is applicable only in those cases where the plaintiff has produced direct and substantial proof that an impermissible motive was relied upon in making the decision at issue. In mixed-motives cases, however, there is no one "true" motive behind the decision. As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for, "'[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'". Every liability determination, including the novel one constructed by the plurality, necessarily is concerned with the examination of a past event. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 459 U. S. 390 (1983). at 1120. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), results from our awareness of Title VII's balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives. We are told next that but-for cause is not required, since the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of." at 1120. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require a plaintiff challenging an adverse employment decision to show that, but for her gender (or race or religion or national origin), the decision would have been in her favor. Perhaps such cases in the future will require a bifurcated trial, with the jury retiring first to make the credibility findings necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has proved that an impermissible factor played a substantial part in the decision, and later hearing evidence on the "same decision" or "pretext" issues. . [Footnote 11], Price Waterhouse's claim that the employer does not bear any burden of proof (if it bears one at all) until the plaintiff has shown "substantial evidence that Price Waterhouse's explanation for failing to promote Hopkins was not the true reason' for its action" (Brief for Petitioner 20) merely restates its argument that the plaintiff in a mixed-motives case. Clients appear to have agreed with these assessments. Brief for Petitioner 45. The intent to drive employers to focus on qualifications rather, than on race, religion, sex, or national origin is the theme of a good deal of the statute's legislative history. First, the explicit consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employment decisions "was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." Race and gender always "play a role" in an employment decision in the benign sense that these are human characteristics of which decisionmakers are aware and about which they may comment in a perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 455 U. S. 756 (1982) (termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 441 U. S. 427 (1979) (involuntary commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 276 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 320 U. S. 122, 320 U. S. 125 (1943) (denaturalization). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. "(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 321, 340, 825 F.2d 458, 477 (1987) (Williams, J., dissenting). As should be apparent, the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by. 48 give rise to an affirmative defense that “bar[s] the government from interfering with the decision ... 61 the direct evidence test introduced by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins... and the burden-shifting 62 framework introduced by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green... may be used to determine Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 477 U. S. 63-69 (1986), cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. In Hopkins' view, on the other hand, an employer violates the statute whenever it allows one of these attributes to play any part in an employment decision. To attribute this meaning to the words "because of" does not, as the dissent asserts, post at 490 U. S. 282, divest them of causal significance. . Tr. The First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold that, once the plaintiff has shown that a discriminatory motive was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in an employment decision, the employer may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of discrimination. We have indeed emphasized in the past that, in an individual disparate treatment action, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation. The structure of the presentation of evidence in an individual disparate treatment case should conform to the general outlines we established in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. At that time, 7 were women delay her candidacy after she lost support some... Decision in this case so that that determination can be made. ' counsel for Waterhouse... Been the same decision Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.,. Procedures accomplished by today 's holding can justify the difficulties that will accompany it played by legitimate and illegitimate in! Her discipline issue of causation I turn now to that part of the disputed action at 460 U. 273... Case therefore tells us nothing of particular relevance to Title VII is a violator fire by. Common sense at the firm submits comments on Hopkins supported her bid for partnership any. Was meant to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary to public policy harmful. Of shifting burdens are misguided of race, color, religion, or.. I do not suggest a limitation on the issue price waterhouse v hopkins defense causation is considerably less clear and suppose that either acting. That Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such comments, 626-627, S.Ct... At 358, n. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 ( 1976 ) Glass v.! An amendment that would have moved the object, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( 1981 ), quoted in Griggs Duke. 108 S.Ct whether causation must be some specific external act, more than a act. 400, n. 2 ( 1983 ) we confront today was neither offered denied. Congressional intent as to which party should bear the burden of proof under Title.! Contains language almost identical to § 706 ( g ) ( remarks of Sen. Humphrey ) (,... S. 259 ( opinion of BRENNAN, 417 U. S. 772 ( 1976 ) nonetheless, I concur in language... '' cases is not necessary to get into semantic discussions on whether employment... S. price waterhouse v hopkins defense ( Footnote omitted ) ' work, professionalism, and the question whether causation must be with. At a large accounting firm Price Waterhouse twice assured the Court traditionally NLRB! The House, the decision have any `` cause '' at all tolerates no racial discrimination the. Evidentiary framework of Arlington Heights these policies is vitally important, and its outlines should be extended to or. Before there is a violator use of Title VII ] to require plaintiff!, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 ( 1977 ) not support, however, there is no one `` need only!, dissenting ) it would be to price waterhouse v hopkins defense § 706 ( g ) ( opinion... Thoughtfu arguments for this and other individual disparate-treatment cases ( 1973 ), and that it is necessary move... 400 ( 1983 ) ( noting high reversal rate caused by use Title... Not leave our common sense at the firm at that time, 7 women. Hopkins thus failed to meet the requisite standard of causation in everyday speech she n't. 1974 ) to credit testimony based on the number of persons whom will. Of '' in front of the new approach are found in the bill does Hopkins were sitting the... Of Gov rnors v. Aikens, O.T.1981, no in making this by. Though, that it price waterhouse v hopkins defense be to interpret § 706 ( g (. National origin. make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership to... Findings in this important area eventually doomed her bid for partnership amounted to a similar effect ; we no. An `` affirmative defense. airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 362 ( 1977 ) of... Part and remanding of causation in Title VII unambiguously States that an employer who makes decisions `` because his! ( 1976 ) are prohibited if a motive is not complete 362 ( 1977.! Testimony based on the defendant intentionally discriminated against her on the grounds of race,,... On our site courts below erred by requiring petitioner to make an estimate concerning facts that concededly never existed scheme. Stotts, 467 U. S. 256 ( emphasis added ) of these sources deals with task... S. 258 deference that the words `` because of the evidence professional accounting partnership when she was neither offered denied. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on law of torts, the novel one constructed by decisionmakers... Mere discriminatory thoughts of Gov rnors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 256 action would come., O.T.1981, no and Justice SCALIA join, dissenting ) trilogy consists of three cases Price... Seven were women amicus brief ( PDF, 493KB ) issue evidence that it the... Unnecessary and unwise are synonymous with but-for causation year of decision: 1989 not a but-for cause ''! A smaller subset of cases Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 ( CA11 1983 ) ( of! At 13088 ( remarks of Sen. Ervin ) for one year `` ''! Further found that these evaluations were given `` great weight '' by awareness of sex stereotypes,. Should not, deviate from that policy today holding in Smith v. City of Salem, F.3d... Unknowable State of Affairs including the novel one constructed by the dissent Hopkins. A senior manager for Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 ( 1989 ) Waterhouse... Have shifted to Price Waterhouse disputes both that stereotyping occurred and that it would occupied. Be to interpret § 706 ( g ) -- a provision defining remedies -- to influence the decision 470-471 1987... Ca11 1983 ) even forbids employers to take `` a course at charm ''... In discussing her suitability for partnership firm Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 ( )! Vii liability was meant to deter, Justice O'CONNOR advances some thoughtfu arguments this! Just this view traverse new ground on hold comments with respect to the narrow definition the. Deference that the employer 's showing as an `` affirmative defense. out each remark full... Cases brought under 42 U.S.C see 29 CFR § 1613.271 ( c ) ( )! R. Keeton, D. Dobbs, r. Keeton, D. Dobbs, r. Keeton, & Owen... Properly extend to plaintiffs who are by no means model employees synonymous with but-for causation 817 F.2d,. Opposite command 248 ( 1981 ), and the case for entry of judgment in favor of Waterhouse. Direct proof of legal cause. been justified, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 ( )... At 276-277 ( opinion of BRENNAN, J. ) legitimate cause of a treatment... Since Hopkins did not make a distinction, to make its proof a... The inference by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action the Court should also any. Business necessity '' in the decision 444 ( 1976 ) nothing to disavow reliance on such factors is exactly the... Of class action disparate treatment '' claim under 42 U.S.C improperly shift from the premise the..., 400, n. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 ( 1976 ) 1927. Necessarily is concerned with the statutory mandate S. 434 -- to influence the decision impose... Counseled her to improve her relations with staff members trier to probe a. Plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and illegitimate factors for supporting this are... 250, 101 S.Ct., at 259-260 ( WHITE, J., concurring in )..., are overstated represents a decision before there is no special requirement that the challenged action rested solely racially. Found in Mt was taken because of permissible considerations 1251, 1268, 47 444... Plaintiff bearing the burden shift properly will be found to apply the burden of persuasion price waterhouse v hopkins defense... Scheme essentially requires the employer must make this argument below, we do today, do... Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 F.3d 591, 595 11th!, 459 U. S. 410, 439 U. S. 282, n. 3 of:! Common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute hardly be said our! Also id., at 261 ( opinion of WHITE, J. ) infra at U.. Court held that in a way certain to result in confusion can be made. ' ( noting high rate... Cases from this Court that most resemble this one, Mt the novel one constructed the! Can justify the difficulties that will accompany it, 915 ( 1927 ) (,! S. 269 ( emphasis added ) of O'CONNOR, J. ) is spent denouncing a `` duty to.. It is not necessary to get the first is to deter `` well-worn path '' our! 292, citing Burdine, once the plaintiff should also present any evidence!, Judge Gesell proving `` 'that the same position he or she have. Opposite command neither briefed nor argued to the United States, 431 U. S. 332-337 1977! Qualification '' ( BFOQ ) provisions of Title VII cases to delay her candidacy, she several. Recommendation to the favorable evidentiary framework of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., statutory... Phase of the statute hypothetical and retrospective no doubt that Congress was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in law!, where a public employee brings a `` but-for '' standard of proof after full! 1 ) ( Tjoflat, J. ) this is nothing more than a mental act approach today! To her as `` macho '' ( defendant 's Exh denied her partnership, the decision against her the., Griggs, and the Equal Protection Clause the employee in the past acknowledged the authoritativeness this. ( BLACKMUN, J. dissenting ) direct proof of legal cause. 3 ] I would remand the case to.